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AbstrAct: developing the arguments put forward in books such as Communitas, in this article 
the political philosopher Roberto Esposito tries to overcome the customary opposition between 
the notions of community and nihilism. his aim is to rethink what community might mean in 
an age of ‘completed nihilism’. in a subtle genealogical and etymological analysis of the concept 
of community, he demonstrates how, rather than establishing a substantial and positive bond, 
community is constituted by nothingness, by a shared lack—which communal, communitarian 
and totalitarian politics seek to deny. the excavation of the meaning of communitas allows Esposito 
to critically examine the manner in which the thinking of community has been expunged by 
modern political philosophy. 
Keywords: Bataille; Community; heidegger; hobbes; nancy; nihilism; nothing; Rousseau; 
totalitarianism 
1. What is the relationship between the terms ‘community’ and ‘nihilism’? the answer 
that comes from the various philosophies of community—but also from a widespread 
interpretation of nihilism—goes in the direction of a radical opposition. nihilism and 
community are not just in a relation of alterity, but in one of open contrast, which 
does not admit points of contact or areas of overlap. they reciprocally exclude each 
other: where one is present—or, when one is present—the other is absent, and vice 
versa. Whether the opposition is located on the synchronic level or along a diachronic 
trajectory, what matters is the clarity of the alternative between two poles that seem to 
acquire a meaning precisely from their irreducibility. nihilism—in its most distinguishing 
connotations of artificiality, anomie, and senselessness—is perceived as that which has 
made community impossible, or even unthinkable. on the other hand, community has 
always interpreted itself as what resists, restrains, and contrasts the nihilistic drift. this is 
basically the role assigned to community by the communal [comuniali], communitarian, 
and communicative conceptions which, for more than a century, have regarded it as the 
only barrier against the devastating power of nothingness which pervades modern society. 
What changes, with regard to this scenario, is the order of succession that is attributed at 
each turn to community and modern society, not their rigidly dichotomous character. 
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if Ferdinand tönnies put community before society—according to a genealogy which 
was then appropriated by all the philosophies of decline, betrayal, and loss originating 
both from the Right and the left at the turn of the twentieth century—contemporary 
neo-communitarians across the atlantic reverse the stages of the dichotomy, yet without 
questioning its basic structure. it is community—or better, the particular communities 
into which the tönniesian archetype has been fragmented—that follows modern 
society in a phase marked by the crisis of the state paradigm and the proliferation of 
multicultural conflict. in this case, community is no longer understood as a residual 
phenomenon with regard to the sociocultural forms assumed by modernity, but rather 
as an objection to the insufficiency of the latter’s individualistic-universalistic model: 
it is the very society of individuals, the destroyer of the ancient organic community, 
that now generates new communitarian forms as a posthumous reaction to its own 
inner entropy. Even from this perspective, what re-emerges is the reciprocal exclusion 
of community and nihilism: community advances or withdraws, expands or contracts 
itself, on the basis of the space which has not yet been ‘colonized’ by nihilism. When 
habermas opposes a communicative to a strategic rationality, he remains within the 
same interpretative paradigm, with an additional, defensive emphasis: the ‘unlimited 
community of communication’ constitutes, at the same time, the point of resistance and 
the reserve of meaning in face of the increasing intrusiveness of technology. the fact 
that community is understood as a transcendental a priori—rather than a factual one, 
like in the more rudimentary approach of the neo-communitarians—does not change 
its basic hermeneutic frame. Even in this case, community, considered as a possibility 
if not a reality, is understood as the borderline and the wall that contains the advance 
of nihilism. it is seen as something full—a substance, a promise, a value—that does 
not let itself be emptied out by the vortex of nothingness. it is another configuration of 
the battle between the ‘thing’ and the ‘nothing’ that functions as a presupposition for 
the entire tradition we are examining: against the explosion—or the implosion—of the 
nothing, community holds back the reality of the thing: or rather, it is the very thing that 
opposes its own annihilation.
2. But is this an acceptable presupposition? is it not itself precisely what hinders any 
thought of a community that would be worthy of our age—which is indeed the age of 
completed nihilism? if we assumed this presupposition as such, we would necessarily 
be obliged to choose between two hypotheses which are equally unacceptable. that is, 
we would find ourselves either negating the structurally nihilistic attitude of the present 
age, or excluding the question of community from our horizon of relevance. in order to 
speak about community in terms that are not simply nostalgic, we would be left with the 
possibility of circumscribing nihilism to an aspect, a particular moment, of our experi-
ence. We could consider it as a ‘fixed term’ phenomenon, bound to dissolve itself or at 
least regress at a certain point. or we could even understand it like a disease which has 
attacked only some organs of an otherwise healthy body. yet this kind of reductive argu-
ment goes against all evidence, which shows that nihilism is not an interlude or a specific 
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situation, but rather the basic tendency of modern society, which has today achieved its 
utmost expression. But what does this mean? the only way to get our head around the 
question without renouncing any of its terms requires bringing together community and 
nihilism in a single argument. Even more, we should not see the completion of nihilism 
as an insurmountable obstacle, but as an opportunity to elaborate a new thinking of 
community. obviously, this does not mean that community and nihilism turn out to be 
identical, or even just symmetrical; that they are to be located on the same level or along 
the same trajectory. Rather, it means that they intersect at a point that the two cannot 
disregard because, in different ways, it is constitutive of them both. this point—which is 
unperceived, repressed, and neutralized by current communitarian philosophies—can 
be regarded as the ‘nothing’. it is this that community and nihilism have in common in 
a way that has so far remained mostly unexplored. 
But in what sense? We leave aside for the time being the (far from simple) question 
about the relation between the nothing and nihilism—yet we shall return to it in a 
short time. let us focus on community. We have seen how it has traditionally been 
opposed to nihilism as if it were the thing itself; and even how its definition is one 
with such an opposition: community would not just be different from the nothing and 
irreducible to it, but it would also coincide with its explicit opposite—a ‘whole’ entirely 
filled by itself. now, i believe that this is precisely the standpoint that should not only be 
problematized, but even reversed: community is not the place of the opposition of the 
thing and the nothing, but that of their superimposition. i have attempted to account 
for this claim by means of an analysis, both etymological and philosophical, of the 
term communitas, starting from the term munus, from which it derives.1 the conclusive 
result of this investigation is community’s categorical distance from any idea of property 
collectively owned by a group of individuals—or even from their belonging to a common 
identity. according to the original value of this concept, what the members of communitas 
share—this is precisely the complex, but pregnant meaning of munus—is rather the 
expropriation of their substance which is not limited to their ‘having’, but involves and 
draws on their very ‘being subjects’. here, my argument unfolds in a way that shifts 
it from the more traditional field of anthropology, or of political philosophy, to the 
(more radical) field of ontology: the fact that community is not linked to a surplus, but a 
deficit, of subjectivity, means that its members are no longer identical to themselves, but 
structurally exposed to a tendency that leads them to break their individual limits and 
face up to their ‘outside’. From this point of view—which breaks any continuity between 
what is ‘common’ and what is ‘one’s own’ [proprio], linking it rather to what is not one’s 
own [improprio]—the figure of the other returns to centre stage. if the subject of the 
community is no longer the ‘same’, he will necessarily be ‘other’. he will not be another 
subject, but a sequence of alterations that never coalesce into a new identity.
3. But if community is always the community of others and never of oneself, this means 
that its presence is structurally inhabited by an absence—of subjectivity, identity, and 
     1. see Roberto Esposito, Communitas. Origine e destino della comunità, turin, Einaudi, 1998.
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property. it means that it is not a ‘thing’—or, it is a thing defined precisely by its ‘not’. a 
‘non-thing’. now, how should we understand such ‘not’? and how does it relate to the 
thing it inheres to? What is for certain is that it does not relate to it in the sense of a pure 
negation. the nothing-in-common is not the opposite of an entity, but rather something 
that corresponds and co-belongs to it in a very intense way. yet we should not misun-
derstand the very meaning of this correspondence, or co-belonging. the nothing of com-
munitas should not be interpreted as what communitas is not yet able to be; as the negative 
moment of a contradiction bound to be solved dialectically in the identity of opposites. 
But neither should it be interpreted as the hiding place in which the thing withdraws 
since it cannot unveil itself in the fullness of a pure presence. as a matter of fact, in both 
cases, the nothing of communitas would not continue to be the nothing of the thing, but 
it would be transformed into something different which the thing would relate to in the 
modes of teleology or presupposition. it would be the thing’s past or its future, not its 
bare present—that which it is and is not other from it. in short, the nothing is not the 
precondition or the outcome of the community—the presupposition that frees it for its 
‘real’ possibility—but rather its only way of being. in other words, community is not 
proscribed, obscured, or veiled by the nothing: it is constituted by it. this simply means 
that community is not an entity, nor a collective subject, nor a group of subjects. it is 
the relation that makes them no longer be individual subjects, since it interrupts their 
identity with a bar that passes through them and thus changes them. it is the ‘with’, the 
‘between’, the threshold on which they cross in a contact that relates them to others to 
the very extent that it separates them from themselves. 
We could say that community is not the inter of the esse, but the esse as inter; not a 
relationship that shapes being, but being itself as a relationship. this is an important 
distinction since it gives us back in the clearest possible way the superimposition of 
being with the nothing: the being of community is the gap, the spacing that relates 
us to others in a common non-belonging, a loss of what is one’s own which never 
manages to be added up into a common good. only lack is common, not possession, 
property and appropriation. the fact that the term munus is understood by the latins 
only as the gift given, and never as the gift received—which is instead rendered by 
the word donum—means that it is a principle that lacks ‘remuneration’. it means that 
the leak of subjective substance which it determines stays there—it cannot be filled in, 
cured, or cicatrized; that its opening cannot be closed by any filling in [risarcitura], or 
compensation [risarcimento], if it is to remain really condivided [condivisa], or shared. in 
the concept of ‘condivision’ the ‘con’, or ‘with’, is indeed associated with ‘division’. the 
limit it alludes to is that which unites, not in the mode of convergence, conversion, 
or confusion, but rather in that of divergence, diversion, and diffusion. the direction 
here is always from the inside to the outside, and never from the outside to the inside. 
Community is the exteriorisation of the inside. For this—given that it is opposed to the 
idea of internalisation, not to mention that of internment—the inter of community can 
only link exteriorities or ‘leakages’, subjects who face up to their outside. this movement 
of decentralisation can be recognized in the very idea of ‘partition’—which refers to 
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both ‘condivision’ and ‘departure’: community is never a place of arrival, but one of 
departure. it is even the very departure towards what does not and will never belong 
to us. therefore communitas is far from producing effects of commonness [comunanza], 
association [accomunamento], or communion. it does not warm us up, or protect us. on 
the contrary, it exposes the subject to the most radical risk: the risk of losing together 
with his individuality also the boundaries that guarantee the fact that he is intangible for 
the other. the risk of suddenly slipping into the nothing of the thing.
4. it is with reference to this nothing that we must address the question of nihilism—in 
a way that is not only able to grasp the connection, but also the distinction of levels on 
which it is based. What i mean to say is that nihilism is not the expression, but the sup-
pression of the nothing-in-common. Certainly, nihilism has to do with the nothing, but 
precisely in the guise of its annihilation. nihilism is not the nothing of the thing, but that 
of the thing’s nothing. it is a nothing squared: the nothing multiplied and simultaneously 
swallowed up by the nothing. this means that we should identify at least two meanings, 
or levels, of the nothing, which must be kept separate in spite of and within their appar-
ent coincidence. While the first level is, as we have seen, that of a relationship—the gap, 
or the spacing, that makes the being-in-common a relation, not an entity—the second 
is, on the other hand, that of its dissolution: the dissolution of the relationship in the ab-
soluteness of the without-relation. 
if we look at hobbes’s absolutism from this perspective, the stages of such a ‘solution’ 
assume an extraordinary clarity. the fact that hobbes inaugurates modern political 
nihilism should not simply be understood in the sense that he ‘discovers’ the nothing-
ness of substance of a world freed from the metaphysical constraint of any transcendent 
veritas; hobbes rather ‘covers’ this nothingness of substance again with another, more 
powerful, nothingness, which has precisely the function of annihilating the potentially 
dissolutive effects of the first. similarly, the pointe of his political philosophy lies in the 
invention of a new origin aimed at damming up—and turning into an ordering com-
pulsion—the original nothing, the absence of origin, of communitas. obviously, such a 
contradictory strategy of neutralisation—emptying the natural void by means of an 
artificial void created ex nihilo—is derived from an altogether negative, and even cata-
strophic, interpretation of the principle of condivision, the initial sharing of being. it is 
precisely the inevitable negativity attributed to the original community that justifies a 
sovereign order—the leviathan state—able to pre-emptively immunize itself from its 
intolerable munus. in order for this operation to be successful—that is, to be logically ra-
tional in spite of its very high cost in terms of sacrifice and renunciation—it is not only 
necessary that such common munus be deprived of its character as donative excess in 
favour of its character as defect, but also that this defect as lack—in the neutral sense of 
the latin delinquere—be understood in terms of a real ‘delict’ [delitto], a crime, or even a 
unstoppable chain of potential crimes.
it is this radically forced interpretation—which turns the nothing-in-common into 
the community of crime—that determines the obliteration of communitas in favour of a 
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political form founded upon the emptying of any relation that is external to the verti-
cal relation between individuals and the sovereign, and consequently upon dissocia-
tion itself. having started off from the need to protect the thing from the nothing that 
appears to threaten it, hobbes thus ends up annihilating not only the nothing, but the 
thing itself; he sacrifices to the interest of the individual not only the inter of the esse, but 
also the esse of the inter. all the modern answers that have been given to the ‘hobbesian 
problem of order’ in the course of centuries—in decisionist, functionalist, and systemic 
guises—run the risk of remaining caught in this vicious circle: the only possible way 
to contain the dangers that are inherent to the original lack [carenza] of man as animal 
seems to be the construction of an artificial prosthesis—the barrier of institutions—able 
to protect him from the potentially destructive contact with his fellow men. yet, assum-
ing a prosthesis, that is, a non-organ, a lacking organ, as a form of social mediation 
means facing the void with a void that is even more radical, since, from the beginning, it 
is seized and produced by the absence that it should compensate for. the very principle 
of representation, understood as the formal device aimed at giving presence to someone 
who is absent, only reproduces and strengthens that void insofar as it is not able to con-
ceptualize its primordial character, which is not derived from anything. in other words, 
the principle of representation is not able to grasp that the nothing that it should com-
pensate for is not a loss of substance, foundation, or value, which suddenly dissolved a 
previous order, but the very character of our being-in-common. not wanting or know-
ing how to dig deeper into the nothing of the relation, modern nihilism finds itself being 
handed over to the nothing of the absolute, the absolute nothing.
5. the modern philosophy of community attempts to elude the absolute nothing through 
an option that is both similar and opposite to the one i have just described; however, it 
ends up falling back into the very nihilism it would like to fight against. in this case, it 
is the thing that is made absolute, rather than the nothing. But what does making the 
thing absolute mean, if not annihilating—and hence once again strengthening—the 
nothing itself? this strategy no longer empties, but, on the contrary, fills in the void 
which is determined, and even constituted, by the primordial munus. Beginning with 
Rousseau and up to contemporary communitarianism, what appears as an alternative 
option turns out to be the specular reverse of hobbesian immunisation, with which it 
shares both the subjectivist lexicon and the particularistic outcome—this time applied 
to a collectivity as a whole, not the individual. What is missing in both cases—crushed 
by the overlapping of the individual with the collective—is relation itself, understood as 
a modality at the same time singular and plural of existence. in the first case, relation is 
annihilated by the absoluteness that separates individuals; in the second, by their fusion 
in a single subject closed within his self-identity. if we take the Rousseauian community 
of Clarens as a model of such an—infinitely reproduced—self-identification, we can 
detect in it in vitro all of its defining characters: from the reciprocal incorporation of its 
members to the perfect self-sufficiency of the whole they give rise to, to the inevitable 
opposition that results from it with regard to its outside. the outside as such is incom-
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patible with a community that is so folded towards its inside that it institutes among its 
members a transparency without opacity, an immediateness without mediations, which 
constantly reduces each member to another who is no longer such since he is pre-emp-
tively identified with the first. the fact that Rousseau does not prefigure—and actually 
constantly denies—the possibility of translating such communauté de coeur into some form 
of political democracy does not eliminate the power of mythological suggestion that it 
has exercised not only on the entire Romantic tradition, but also, in different ways, on 
the ideal type of the organic Gemeinschaft—itself founded on the generality of an essential 
will which has precedence over that of its individual members. 
But there is something else that pertains more specifically to this unwittingly nihilistic 
relapse of the opposition of community to the nihilism of modern society—to which 
community not only shows itself to be fully adherent, but also strictly functional as its 
mere reverse. Each time that the lack of sense of the individualistic paradigm has been 
opposed to the surplus of sense of a community filled by its own collective essence, the 
consequences have been destructive: first for the internal, or external, enemies against 
whom the community was established, and eventually for the community itself. this 
obviously applies in the first place to the totalitarian experiments which have stained 
with blood the first half of the last century, but also, in a different and less devastating 
way, to all forms of ‘fatherland’, ‘motherland’, or ‘brotherland’ [fratria] which have 
gathered crowds of followers, patriots, and brothers around a model inevitably centred 
on a koine. the reason of this tragic compulsion to repeat—which does not seem to 
be on the wane—lies in the fact that when the thing fills itself to the brim with its 
own substance, it runs the risk of exploding or imploding under its own weight. this 
happens as soon as the subjects gathered in the communal [comuniale] bond identify 
the access to their condition of possibility in the re-appropriation of their own common 
essence. the latter, in turn, appears to shape itself as the fullness of a lost origin, which 
would be for this reason retrievable in the internalisation of a temporarily exteriosized 
existence. in this way, it is assumed that it is possible, and even necessary, to elide—or 
fill in—the void of essence that constitutes the ex of exsistentia—its not being its own since 
it is ‘common’. it is only in this way—by means of the abolition of its nothing—that the 
thing can finally be realized. yet, the (necessarily phantasmatic) realisation of the thing 
is, as a matter of fact, the aim of totalitarianism; the absolute lack of differentiation 
that ends up suppressing not only its own object, but the very subject that puts it into 
effect. the thing can only be appropriated in its destruction. it cannot be retrieved for 
the simple reason that it was never lost: what appears to be lost is only the nothing that 
constitutes it in its common dimension.
6. the first thinker who looked for the community in the nothing of the thing was 
heidegger. although it is impossible to retrace here the complex trajectory of the inter-
rogation about the thing that unfolded throughout his work, it is necessary to focus on 
the 1950 paper titled ‘the thing’ (Das Ding). such trajectory seems to culminate in this 
paper; even more crucially, the ‘thing’—which is elsewhere addressed in its aesthetic, 
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logical, or historical aspects—is here brought back to its common essence. this expres-
sion needs to be understood in a twofold way. First, in the sense that heidegger sum-
mons up the most modest, ordinary, and down-to-earth things—in this text, the jug. 
But also in the sense that this modesty looks after the empty point in which the thing 
recovers its least expected meaning, as heidegger had already argued in The Origin of  
the Work of  Art: ‘the unpretentious thing evades thought most stubbornly. or can it be 
that this self-refusal of the mere thing […] belongs precisely to the essence of the thing?’2 
the lecture on ‘the thing’ is devoted precisely to the definition of this essence—‘the 
thingness of the thing’. this does not amount to the objectivity in which we represent 
the thing; or to the production from which the (produced) thing seems to ‘originate’. and 
so? it is precisely here that the example of the jug is helpful—but also that of the other 
‘things’ heidegger refers to in the essays of those years, such as the tree, the bridge, and 
the threshold. What characteristic element links them all? Basically, it is the void. the 
void is the essence of these things, as well as of all things in general. this is the case with 
the jug—which is literally gathered together around a void and is, in the last instance, 
formed by it: ‘When we fill the jug, the pouring that fills it flows into the empty jug. the 
emptiness, the void, is what does the vessel’s holding. the empty space, this nothing of 
the jug [Die Leere, dieses Nichts am Krug], is what the jug is as the holding vessel’.3 the es-
sence of the thing is therefore its nothingness, to the extent that outside of the perspec-
tive this opens, the thing loses its most intimate nature, to the point of disappearing—or, 
like heidegger has it, to the point of being annihilated. as soon as we forget about its es-
sence ‘in truth, the thing as thing remains proscribed, nil, and in that sense annihilated 
[In Wahrheit bleibt jedoch das Ding als Ding verwehrt, nichtig und in solchem Sinne vernichtet]’.4
all this may seem to be paradoxical: the thing is annihilated if we do not grasp fully 
its essential character. yet, as we have just seen, this essential character lies in nothing 
else than its void. it is the forgetting of this nothingness—this void—that hands the thing 
over to a scientistic [scientista], productivist, and nihilistic point of view which nullifies it. 
Even in this case, we find ourselves obliged to establish a distinction between two kinds 
of ‘nothingness’: the first gives us back the thing in its deep reality, while the second re-
moves it from us. or better still, nullifying the first nothingness, the second nullifies the 
thing itself that is constituted by it. some lines later, heidegger gives us the key to this 
apparent paradox: the nothingness that saves the thing from nothingness—to the extent 
that it essentially constitutes it as thing—is the nothingness of the munus, the offer that 
reverses the inside into the outside: ‘to pour from the jug is to give [schenken]’.5 not only 
this, but this nothingness is the nothingness of the ‘common’ munus insofar as it gives 
itself in the gathering and as a gathering: ‘the nature of the holding void is gathered in 
     2. martin heidegger, ‘the origin of the Work of art’, in david Farrell Krell (ed.), Basic Writings, london, 
Routledge and Kegan paul, 1978, p. 161.
     3. martin heidegger, ‘the thing’, Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. albert hofstadter, london, harper 
perennial, 1976, p. 169.
     4. heidegger, ‘the thing’, pp. 170-1.
     5. heidegger, ‘the thing’, p. 172.
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the giving’.6 to this end, heidegger recalls the old German words thing and dinc in their 
original meaning of ‘reunion’. the giving expressed by the void of the jug is also and 
above all a gathering. What is it that gathers together the void of the thing by offering 
it? heidegger adds at this point the motif of the ‘fourfold’, that is to say, the relation be-
tween the earth and the sky, mortals and divinities. But what we should focus on is the 
relation as such: the nothing that it puts in common is the community of the nothing as 
the essence of the thing. is it not precisely this—the pure relation—that constitutes the 
common element of all the things mentioned above: the tree that links the earth to the 
sky, the bridge that connects two banks, the threshold that joins the inside with the out-
side? Just as is the case with communitas, is this not a unity in distance and of distance; of 
a distance that unites or a separation that brings near? and what is, in the end, nihilism 
if not an abolition of distance—of the nothingness of the thing—that makes any near-
ness impossible? ‘the failure of nearness [das Ausbleiben der Nähe] to materialize in con-
sequence of the abolition of all distances has brought the distanceless to dominance. in 
the default of nearness the thing remains annihilated as a thing in our sense’.7
7. the only author who tackled the question opened by heidegger—that of the relation 
between community and the nothing in the time of completed nihilism—is Georges 
Bataille: ‘‘Communication’ cannot proceed from one full and intact being to another. it 
requires beings whose being in themselves is risked, placed at the limit of death and noth-
ingness [néant]’.8 this passage refers back to a short text entitled ‘nothingness, tran-
scendence, immanence’ in which nothingness is defined as ‘the limit of a being’ beyond 
which this being ‘no longer exists, no longer is. For us, that nonbeing is filled with mean-
ing: i know i can be reduced to nothing [Ce non-être est pour nous plein de sens: je sais qu’on 
peut m’anéantir]’.9 Why is the possibility of being annihilated filled with meaning—and 
even amounts to the only workable meaning at a time when every other meaning seems 
to be waning? this question leads us to both Bataille’s interpretation of nihilism and the 
point at which it crosses aporetically the inhabitable place of community. For Bataille, 
nihilism is not a flight of sense—or from sense—but rather its closure within a homoge-
neous and completed conception of being. there aren’t other instances in which nihil-
ism is less reducible to what threatens to empty the thing. on the contrary, nihilism is 
what clogs the thing in a fullness without cracks or fissures. in short, nihilism should not 
be looked for on the side of the lack, but on that of the subtraction of lack. it is the lack 
of lack—its repression or filling in. it is what subtracts us from our otherness blocking 
us inside ourselves; what makes that ‘us’ into a series of completed individuals who are 
turned towards their inside, fully resolved in themselves:
Boredom then discloses the nothingness of self-enclosure [le néant de l’être enfermé 
sur lui-même]. When a separate being stops communicating, it withers. it wastes 
away, (obscurely) feeling that by itself  it doesn’t exist. unproductive and unattractive, 
     6. heidegger, ‘the thing’, p. 172.
     7. heidegger, ‘the thing’, p. 181.
     8. Georges Bataille, On Nietzsche, trans. Bruce Boone, london, athlone press, 1992, p. 19 (my translation).
     9. Bataille, On Nietzsche, p. 177.
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such inner nothingness repels us. it brings about a fall into restless boredom, and 
boredom transfers the restlessness from inner nothingness to outer nothingness—
or anguish.10
What emerges here clearly is the twofold level of the semantics of nothingness and, at 
the same time, the movement Bataille carries out from the first to the second level—
from the nothingness of the individual, of what is one’s own, the inside, to the nothing-
in-common of the outside. this second nothing is also a nothing, but it is the nothing 
that tears us away from the absolute nothing—the nothing of the absolute—since it is 
the nothing of relation. man is structurally exposed to—but we should also say: consti-
tuted by—the paradoxical condition of being able to avoid annihilation by implosion 
only running the risk of annihilating himself by explosion: ‘With temptation, if i can put 
it in this way, being is crushed by the twin pincers of nothingness. By not communicat-
ing, it is annihilated into the emptiness of an isolated life. By communicating it likewise 
risks being destroyed’.11
the fact that Bataille—here as elsewhere—speaks of ‘being’ alluding to our exist-
ence should not be interpreted only as a terminological imprecision due to the non-
professional philosophical character of his thought, but as the intentional effect of an 
overlapping between anthropology and ontology within the common figure of lack, or, 
more precisely, the ripping [déchirure]. indeed, it is true that we are able to face up to 
the being that lies outside our boundaries only if we break them—and even identify 
ourselves with such a rupture. But this is due to the fact that being is also primordially 
lacking with regard to itself, since the ground of things does not amount to a substance 
but a primordial opening. We access this ground—this gap—in the limit-experiences 
that take us away from ourselves, from the mastery of our existence. yet these experi-
ences are nothing else than the anthropological effect (or the subjective dimension) of 
the void of being that originates them: a big hole made by several holes that alternately 
open themselves inside it. in this sense, we could well say that man is the wound of a 
being that is in its turn always-already wounded. this means that when we speak of the 
being-in-common, the ‘communal’ [‘comuniale’], as a continuum into which every exist-
ence that has broken its own individual boundaries falls back, we should not understand 
this continuum as a homogeneous whole—this is precisely the nihilistic perspective. nor 
should we understand it as being in the strict sense of the word—or as what is other 
from being. We should rather understand it as a vortex—the common munus—in which 
the continuum is one with what is discontinuous, and being is one with not-being. this 
is the reason why the ‘greatest’ communication does not look like an addition or a multi-
plication, but rather like a subtraction. it does not take place in the passage between the 
one and the other, but in that between the other of the one and the other of the other:
the beyond of my being is first of all nothingness. this is the absence i discern in 
laceration and in painful feelings of lack: it reveals the presence of another person. 
such a presence, however, is fully disclosed only when the other similarly leans over 
     10. Bataille, On Nietzsche, p. 23.
     11. Bataille, On Nietzsche, p. 24.
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the edge of nothingness or falls into it (dies). ‘Communication’ only takes place 
between two people who risk themselves, each lacerated and suspended, perched atop a 
common nothingness [l’un et l’autre penchés au-dessus de leur néant].12
8. We could well say that, with heidegger and Bataille, twentieth-century thought on 
community reaches its point of maximum intensity and, at the same time, its outermost 
limit. this is not due to the fact that twentieth-century thought experiences in their 
philosophies several relapses in a mythical and regressive direction; or because it is not 
possible to register—around and after these two authors—elaborations, developments, 
and new intuitions which, in different ways and with different inflections, refer back to 
the question of the cum: the writings—and lives—of simon Weil, dietrich Bonhoeffer, 
Jan patočka, Robert antelme, osip mandelstam, and paul Celan bear witness to the 
opposite. Rather, this is due to the fact that even these thinkers could think community 
only starting from the problem posed, and never solved, by heidegger and Bataille. it 
is for the same reason that all that separates us from them—the philosophy, sociology, 
and political studies of the second half of the twentieth century—remains forgetful of 
the question of community. or, worse, it contributes to the distortion of community 
whenever it reduces it to the defence of new particularisms. only in the last few years, 
this drift—experienced and produced by all the ongoing debates on individualism and 
communitarianism—has been countered, especially in France and italy, by an attempt 
to launch a new philosophical reflection on community that starts exactly at the point 
where the previous one was interrupted in the mid of the twentieth century (see Es-
posito 1998; agamben 1993; nancy 1991; Blanchot 1984).13 the necessary reference to 
heidegger and Bataille that characterizes this reflection is accompanied, however, by 
the clear awareness that we live with the inevitable exhaustion of their lexicon, that is, 
in a condition—both material and spiritual—which they could not know fully.
once again, i am alluding to nihilism, and more precisely to the further acceleration 
that took place within its uninterrupted ‘completion’ during the last decades of the twen-
tieth century. it is perhaps precisely this acceleration that allows—but also imposes on 
us—a recommencement of the thought on community in a direction which heidegger 
and Bataille could only guess, but not thematize. What direction? Without presuming 
to offer an exhaustive answer to what is the question of our time, it is inevitable to take 
another look at the figure of the ‘nothing’. nancy, the contemporary author who, more 
than any other, has the merit of having made a breach in the closure of the thought on 
community, writes the following: ‘the question is rather to know how to conceive of the 
“nothing” itself. Either it is the void of truth, or it is nothing else than the world itself and 
the meaning of being-in-the-world’.14 how should we understand this alternative, and is 
     12. Bataille, On Nietzsche, pp. 20-1.
     13. see: Giorgio agamben, The Coming Community, trans. michael hardt, minneapolis, university of min-
nesota press, 1993, maurice Blanchot, La communauté inavouable, paris, minuit, 1984, Esposito, Communitas, 
Jean-luc nancy, The Inoperative Community, trans. lisa Garbus, peter Connor, michael holland, and simona 
sawhney, minneapolis, university of minnesota press, 1990.
     14. Jean-luc nancy, The Sense of  the World, trans. Jeffrey s. librett, minneapolis, university of minnesota 
press, 1997, p. 62.
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it really an alternative? to this end, we could observe that, from a certain point of view, 
it is precisely the absence of community—and even its desertification—that shows us its 
necessity as what we lack, and even as our own lack; as a void that does not ask to be 
filled in by new or ancient myths, but rather re-interpreted in light of its own ‘not’. 
But the sentence from nancy i have just quoted tells us something more—some-
thing more precise—which we could summarize in the following way. the outcome of 
the extreme completion of nihilism—the absolute uprooting; the unfolding of technolo-
gy; the integral character of globalisation—has two faces which we should not only dis-
tinguish, but also make interact: we could say that community is nothing else than the 
limit that separates and, at the same time, links them. on the one hand, sense appears 
to be lacerated, stretched out of shape, desertified—and this is the destructive aspect 
which we know so well: the end of any generality of sense, and the loss of mastery over 
the overall meaning of our experience. But, on the other hand, this very deactivation, 
this devastation, of general meaning opens the space of the contemporary world to the 
emergence of a singular sense that coincides precisely with the absence of sense and, at 
the same time, reverses it into its opposite. it is precisely when every given sense—lo-
cated in a basic framework of reference—disappears that the sense of the world as such 
makes itself visible, reversed in its outside, with no reference to any sense, or meaning, 
that transcends it. Community is nothing other than the border, or transition, between 
this immense devastation of sense and the necessity that each singularity, each event, 
each fragment of existence must be in itself meaningful. it refers back to the character, 
both singular and plural, of an existence freed from any presupposed, or imposed, or 
postponed sense; of a world reduced to itself, able to be simply what it is: a planetary 
world, without direction or cardinal points. a nothing-else-than-world. and it is this 
nothing in common which is the world that associates us in the condition of exposition 
to the hardest absence of sense and, at the same time, to the opening of a sense yet to 
be thought.
translated by lorenzo Chiesa
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